TNAG-1265-FCO40-1612-Future-of-Hong-Kong-despatch-on--The-Hong-Kong-Negotiations--1983 — Page 24

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announcement and keep the door open for further work. There

would be a good chance the Chinese would not break off talks

in such a situation.

21.

Looking further down the road, there would seem to be three

possible courses. In the first place, and assuming the final

package, whether it was the 12-point plan or something more

detailed, was unsatisfactory, we could assert the right we have

reserved to ourselves throughout and simply reject it. We should,

however, be clear about the likely consequences of this.

Rejection and the ensuing confrontation would not cause the

Chinese to back down. Concessions by them on the main points of

principle would be suicidal for their leaders.

On the contrary,

confrontation would provoke a stiffening in the Chinese position

and perhaps even,

if there were to be unrest in Hong Kong,

intervention on their part earlier than 1997. In any event,

confrontation would not prevent us having to return 92 percent of

the territory in 1997 under a treaty which we have throughout

maintained to be valid. It would not win us international support.

It would prevent us from doing anything to ameliorate the lot of

the Hong Kong inhabitants after 1997 and, more immediately, it

would make Hong Kong very difficult to govern in the period

running up to 1997. It would be likely to provoke a considerable

outflow of Hong Kong inhabitants, with resultant immigration

problems for the UK and it would inflict lasting damage on Sino-

British relations. It may exert a superficial attraction, given

Chinese intransigence, but there is no future for Hong Kong in it.

/22. A

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