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possible stipulation that any British who remain in official
posts after 1997 may do so only as advisers.
On the other hand,
they may refuse to provide detail we regard as essential.
Whatever progress we make, there is likely in the end to be a
dangerous imprecision over many areas of the post-1997 arrangements.
19. This steady degradation of the choice will impose great
strains in EXCO and also present us with very unpalatable decisions.
We shall retain the right to reject the Chinese terms and, in
effect, choose confrontation. But the alternative to confrontation
could now well prove to be cooperation in carrying out a Chinese
plan in which we lack real confidence.
20. It would be profitless to try to forecast the precise course
of negotiations. But we are likely to be increasingly affected
in coming months by the Chinese intention to announce their plan
in September 1984, by which time any agreement is extremely
unlikely. This will make it necessary to concentrate detailed
discussion on the key central issues, so that we can make the
maximum impact on the 12-point plan and add as much helpful detail
as possible before the announcement. It will also make it
necessary to consider some parallel announcement on our own side
at the same time. This would presumably indicate that we were
exploring the Chinese plan, had found many areas with which we
could agree, but that there remained other areas requiring further
discussion. If these remaining questions could be satisfactorily
resolved, we would be prepared to extend our cooperation.
an announcement would mitigate the effect of the Chinese
Such
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14.
/announcement
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