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announcement and keep the door open for further work. There
would be a good chance the Chinese would not break off talks
in such a situation.
21.
Looking further down the road, there would seem to be three
possible courses. In the first place, and assuming the final
package, whether it was the 12-point plan or something more
detailed, was unsatisfactory, we could assert the right we have
reserved to ourselves throughout and simply reject it. We should,
however, be clear about the likely consequences of this.
Rejection and the ensuing confrontation would not cause the
Chinese to back down. Concessions by them on the main points of
principle would be suicidal for their leaders.
On the contrary,
confrontation would provoke a stiffening in the Chinese position
and perhaps even,
if there were to be unrest in Hong Kong,
intervention on their part earlier than 1997. In any event,
confrontation would not prevent us having to return 92 percent of
the territory in 1997 under a treaty which we have throughout
maintained to be valid. It would not win us international support.
It would prevent us from doing anything to ameliorate the lot of
the Hong Kong inhabitants after 1997 and, more immediately, it
would make Hong Kong very difficult to govern in the period
running up to 1997. It would be likely to provoke a considerable
outflow of Hong Kong inhabitants, with resultant immigration
problems for the UK and it would inflict lasting damage on Sino-
British relations. It may exert a superficial attraction, given
Chinese intransigence, but there is no future for Hong Kong in it.
/22. A
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