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The Institute for the Study of Coct
process that shows signs of already being contemplated if not under way)11 to an outright announcement that from 1997 onwards China will regard all lease- holders in the New Territories—or even throughout Hong Kong-as the equivalent of freeholders. China might see two advantages in unilateral action: (a) It could win many friends, and considerable support, in Hong Kong; and (b) It would enable their negotiators to keep up a tough, even confrontational, posture at the talks for as long as they deemed it expedient,
3. The respective views on the validity of the treaties. Sooner or later, as soon in fact as both sides feel the need for real momentum and progress, there must be an acknowledged agreement to differ-with a recognition of, and respect for, the other side's position. One could argue that a tacit agreement has already been manifest in the past, though it may not suit China's present purpose to admit this.
4. Sovereignty after 1997. In this area too there seems scope, given goodwill, for at least provisional agreement. China regards sovereignty as its own as of right and maintains that a formal "reversion" of Hong Kong would only set the seal on this fact; in this sense for China sovereignty is non-negotiable. Britain on the other hand regards sovereignty as validly its own now but—since it could not effectively exercise it over a Hong Kong deprived of the New Terri- tories-negotiable. Yet this gulf is surely bridgable if there is a prior amicable agreement to differ about the treaties. Sooner or later, China must be expected to accept that if Britain is to cede sovereignty in a context of harmony and mutual advantage it must first be assured that there are agreed arrangements for the future of Hong Kong to meet both China's and Britain's requirements.
5. Administration after 1997. Here, needless to say, is the nub of the problem, and difficult in that both China and Britain may well feel reluctant to commit themselves, or declare their bedrock positions, on one vital aspect until a late stage in the negotiations. But the question “What type of administration?” does not seem intractable in itself. The likely answer surely, which would meet the wishes and interests of both sides, is "a Hong Kong administration”.
China has implicitly gone some way towards recognising the need for a con- tinuity of law and procedure whenever it has stressed that Hong Kong should "continue to prosper" and fulfil its existing role as a trading, industrial and financial centre; and it has also appeared to recognise (in its attitudes over the last 20 years to both Hong Kong and Macau) that for ideological and other reasons it is better that such special territories should not be administered directly by China itself. A Hong Kong administration, based on the same laws. procedures and structure as exist today, would also meet Britain's historic and continuing need for a place out of which to do business with China and the region.
However, the term "Hong Kong administration" needs qualification. It would undoubtedly be a "Hong Kong-Chinese administration”—meaning an administration manned by Chinese who have grown up in Hong Kong and who
The Prospects for Hong Kong
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are in fact already in process of taking over the administration under the Hong Kong government's policy of "localisation". The speed and comprehensiveness of this process is not immediately apparent to visitors to Hong Kong, for their attention is caught by the small minority of British and other expatriate staff who occupy some, but far from all, of the most senior or technically specialised posts in government.
One can regard it as either a crude statement of reality, or as a tribute to the effectiveness and earnestness with which the government has pursued its pro- gramme of localisation, that if every non-Chinese face was today removed instantly from the ranks of public servants, the gaps would be filled: the administration would doubtless creak and falter for a while; it would not collapse. By 1997, at any rate, it is safe to predict that the administration will be "British" only in terms of the laws and procedures it has inherited from the United Kingdom. A few expatriate specialists will amost certainly still be in place, notably those bilingual in Chinese and English. But the administration will be "Hong Kong-Chinese".
Anyone who is surprised by this may have been led astray by facile compari- sons-for example, of Hong Kong with Aden or of Hong Kong with certain ex-colonial African territories. Such comparisons are utterly false. A far better comparison would be Singapore, a city-state whose administration, manned mostly by Chinese and operating on a largely western-derived system of law, has amply proved its capacity to function without expatriates.
The vital question, then, is not one of who will man the administration, which must be regarded as pre-determined, but rather: "To whom will the administra- tion be answerable? To whom will it turn for guidance on external relations? Who will constitute its ultimate point of poltical reference? Those in power in London, or those in power in Peking?”
The former is conceivable, since it might just suit China's concept of its interests. Answerability to London is comparable with the present status of Macau; yet one must recall that Peking has cast strong doubt on whether that status (a part of China administered by Portugal) is durable. If the notion that Britain should be the answerable administrative power did prevail, then there would predictably be two concomitants: (a) The arrangement would have a term set to it, and require underpinning by a formal agreement if not a treaty, and the device of a "trust" or a "lease-back" might be applicable; and (b) China would almost certainly insist on a strong and official advisory and monitoring presence (as it has already requested and as could well come about even before 1997).
More likely, it is suggested, is the prospect that an interim "trust” or “lease- back" arrangement will be abandoned in favour of a clearer-cut non- transitional outcome-meaning answerability to Peking. It is conceivable that such a status would be reconcilable with a nominal "independence", though at the time of writing this seems highly questionable. What is more predictable is that, before ceding the principle that Hong Kong should be answerable to Peking, Britain would seek satisfaction on two points: first, that the head of administration in Hong Kong would be assured of similar powers, and a similar discretion, to those enjoyed by the present Governor, thus securing for Hong
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