TNAG-1234-FCO40-1547-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 54

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The Institute for the Study of Coct

Kong continuance of the essential condition of self-management; and secondly, that the United Kingdom, as a right and not just out of courtesy, would be entitled itself to have adequate facilities for advising and communicating with the administration. It is difficult to imagine that China, unless for now unfathomable reasons it preferred a disputatious rather than an amicable handover, should find it difficult to satisfy an old and familiar trading partner on both these points. For both concessions would meet China's requirements and promote its interests to no less a degree than they would be convenient to Britain and supportive of a viable Hong Kong.

CONCLUSION: POINTERS FROM THE PAST

In drawing this study to a close one should perhaps begin with an apologia for a dominantly historical approach. The defence has to be that this is the way that Peking tends to analyse its problems and arrive at its decisions. "Hong Kong is a problem left by history", the Chinese are fond of saying.

This approach, that arguably throws clearer light on Chinese thinking and intentions, also serves as a reminder of major questions which impinge on Hong Kong's prospects: such as, for example, the likelihood that the Sino-Soviet rift will be repaired, a question that assumed topical relevance through the coinci- dence that the Sino-British negotiations in Peking opened almost simultane- ously with the start of Sino-Soviet discussions, on trade and other relations, in the same city.

The answer has to be that this likelihood is small. The historic “inequalities” that arose from Russia's imperial expansion eastward remain uncorrected and are in a different and more serious category to localised post-colonial anomalies such as Hong Kong or Macau. Peking's relations with the Soviet Union may be visibly improved through the tidying and containment of border issues and other differences; but for China to drop its thesis that Soviet "hegemonism” is a major threat to world peace would require something amounting to a concep- tual somersault.

Much the same sort of answer must be given to the question whether a Cultural Revolutionary ferment could recur. Despite the naïve and misleading use of the word "liberalisation" to describe the changes that took place in China in the late 1970s; despite the possibility (albeit remote) that unrest in Hong Kong could conceivably arise as part of a short-term "scenario" that might not be unwelcome to Peking; one concludes that a repetition throughout China and worldwide of the events of 1966-67 could only take place as a result of the overthrow of China's political set-up as we know it today.

Reflections on China's interpretation of the patterns of 19th and 20th cen- tury history prompt two further thoughts: (a) That while it would be perfectly logical for Peking to decide that it would be appropriate to substitute a new "equal" treaty for the dead "unequal" agreements, it is no less possible that the Chinese would prefer an accommodation that excluded any formulae once used in a context historically offensive to themselves; and (b) That in the current negotiations the Chinese undoubtedly regard the corrective pattern of history as being on their side: conferring not just a power to "call the shots" and

Prospects for Hong Kong

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occupancy of the driving seat, but a historic obligation to ensure that any settlement makes full response to the call of ancestral voices and full provision

for the expectations of future generations.

Such reflections may appear to inhibit confidence in the likelihood of a settlement acceptable to Britain and agreeable to the people of Hong Kong. In fact, China's sweepingly forceful view of its destiny can also be construed as favourable to Hong Kong's prospects.

Hong Kong's record of progress and achievement now constitutes (and should increasingly constitute) for Peking, not so much an embarrassment as a cause of national pride. The egg-laying goose may have been nurtured on a largely imported diet and may have thrived in a paddock largely constructed to others' specifications, but it is still a Chinese goose; its productive capacity attributable as much to its pedigree as to its immediate environment. A new agreement recognising the rightful ownership of the paddock may be overdue; the way that paddock is tended must remain such as will sustain a fine and provenly useful creature.

There is no reason to believe that a highly positive view of Hong Kong's prospects does not square with China's understanding of its own capacity and destiny. The momentum that Hong Kong, if left largely to its own internal devices, will continue to generate, is something which China would logically wish to further, not to halt.

All those non-Chinese (especially those from the United Kingdom) who have been privileged to spend all or parts of their lives in Hong Kong, and thus can bear witness to the energy that has made the territory what it is today, will devoutly hope that the changes which are now under discussion in Peking will allow Hong Kong to evolve and prosper in the short term as well as the long, through the remaining years of this century as well as in the ages to come. One certainty is that change will not mean decay. Fossilisation comes nowhere into the reckoning.