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The Institute for the Study of Colút
not include this heavily underlined date.) China would have been happy to let matters rest for quite a few years yet; even five years is a longish term for political projections, let alone for prospective commitments.
Although Peking was persuaded that, for the sake of maintaining inter- national confidence in Hong Kong as a place with an assured economic future, an early start to discussions was required, it is more than possible that the relatively uncompromising public attitude it adopted from mid-1982 reflected a continuing belief that it is still too soon, from China's point of view, for nuts-and-bolts issues involving firm commitments for the future to be grappled with in earnest.
In which case, while one can be reasonably certain that the Chinese leaders will at intervals come forth with sufficiently credible assurances to prevent an acute crisis of confidence and a massive flight of capital from Hong Kong, it seems likely that the negotiations will indeed be tough and protracted. They could even break down or be stalled temporarily. For it might suit China's concept of its interests to play for time-and possibly for a time when there would be a new administration in London.
This would be a dangerous course, since through miscalculation confidence in Hong Kong could be impaired to a degree which would make its restoration very difficult, but it cannot be ruled out. Parallel with such a tactic, for a time at least the tenets of psychological warfare might come into play, and even street disturbances in Hong Kong, encouraged or approved by Peking, would not be beyond the bounds of possibility.
Whether or not some members of the Chinese leadership have such thoughts in mind, there is no doubt that they showed little pleasure in the encounter with their British guest in September, the victor of the South Atlantic War. The Chinese had earlier expressed disapproval of the British case over the Falkland Islands and, though they would agree that the issue of Hong Kong falls into a totally different (non-colonial) category, they would resent any political or personal mannerism on the part of Mrs Thatcher (the displacer of their "old friend", Mr Edward Heath) that, however unintentionally, evoked echoes of her resolute military riposte to the Argentine invasion.
Only someone who was present at the meetings in China would be qualified to pass judgement. It is possible that the Chinese leaders had made up their minds in advance to confront the Prime Minister with a blunt and unqualified reiteration of their claim that "Hong Kong belongs to us"; in which case she had little choice but to remind them that Britain regarded its present position in Hong Kong as valid in international law. Whoever was responding to whom or to what, the discussions clearly took the form of a confrontation rather than a meeting of minds.
It would be idle to consider at length various other factors that may well have disposed China to adopt a "squaring up" posture as a preliminary to the negotiations. These factors could have included: (a) A likely annoyance at the public opinion polls conducted in Hong Kong; (b) Preoccupations with internal political and constitutional issues partly stimulated by the Chinese Communist Party's twelfth National Congress which was in September; (c) Signs of the possible emergence of a tough "Young Turk" element in senior party positions;
* It should be pointed out, however, that although Mrs Thatcher undoubtedly made this point following her China visit (i.e. when questioned about it at a news conference in Hong Kong), it is possible that she did not feel obliged to make it, and that the question of the validity of the treaties did not in fact come up, during the visit. It should also be remembered that the main object of her visit as regards Hong Kong—agreement that discussions should be started—was achieved.
The Prospects for Hong Kong
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and (d) The importance that the Taiwan issue assumes in the determining of China's national priorities.
China's tactical initiatives and responses, however motivated, undoubtedly obscure rather than clarify the main issues that the negotiators on both sides will eventually have to resolve. Another potential source of obscurity lies in the temptation to focus too closely on the various concepts of "transitional" and "interim" administrations that have been proposed and aired in Hong Kong and elsewhere over the last 12 months. Such formulae include the proposal for a “lease-back”, widely canvassed; the idea of a “trust territory” (put forward by the Reform Club) to be administered by Britain under an agreement with China; and, of course, the "guesstimating" of suitable durations for such regimes-in the case of the "trust territory", a 20-year minimum period of British administration, with 10 years' notice of a decision to end the arrange- ment.
It could turn out eventually that one of these proposals will form part of a settlement. But it seems unsound to suppose that discussion of such arrange- ments will take place in any early stages of the negotiations. It is as well therefore that neither these ideas, nor those Chinese utterances that could be part of China's pre-talks tactics, loom too largely in our thinking when we consider, under five headings, the form that negotiations could take.
1. The duration of the talks. A Conservative MP, Sir Paul Bryan, who has for a long time followed Hong Kong's fortunes with interest and sympathy, sug- gested in August 1982 that the negotiations might take two years. This, it is suggested, should be regarded as a minimum. It certainly seems a highly optimistic forecast if account is taken of (a) the possibility, already noted, that China will choose to play for time; and (b) the opinion of Hong Kong's Governor that a settlement will be reached "step by step", or in stages. It could be more realistic to think in terms of five years overall, possibly rather longer.
2. The timing, and form, of interim assurances to Hong Kong. One must assume, since both Britain and China are agreed that the interests of each would be jeopardised if confidence in the territory were allowed to descend to a level that seriously impaired its capacity to operate effectively as a commercial, financial, entrepôt and manufacturing centre, that the question of assurances is already under consideration at the talks. It is a matter of urgency, and the timing will surely reflect that: some measures or statements of reassurance must be expected within months, if not weeks.
As regards the form such measures or statements would take, there must be doubt. One possibility is that Britain and China will reach early agreement on something amounting to a joint declaration of intent, covering a period of some years following 1997, which would facilitate an extension of property leases in the New Territories for a definite number of years (possibly 10), without prejudice to the final outcome of the negotiations.
It is, however, equally possible that China's leaders will prefer to give similar, or other, assurances unilaterally. If so, there are several options available to them, ranging from the encouragement of China-controlled banks in Hong Kong to grant property mortgages and loans extending well beyond 1997 (a
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