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The Institute for the Study of Còpict
“status quo” and the evident wide acceptability of a British administration under Chinese sovereignty" do not necessarily imply that the respondents would wish or expect to have many, or even any, British expatriate faces in the administration; the question was not put, but the "status quo" (it is worth noting) includes a rapid and thorough-going process of staff localisation. As regards China, many of those who either favoured or expected a "status quo" solution were far from disdainful in their comments about life in the People's Republic today; there were references, for example, to the advantages of less crowded living conditions and a less demanding work tempo.12
What the polls do reveal, if one tries to marry the key findings of both, is one strong preference and one clear acceptance. The preference is for a continua- tion for many years to come of an administration run on essentially the same lines as today's. The acceptance is of the prospect of a transfer of sovereignty to China in or around 1997.
While giving a clear outline of what Hong Kong would like or accept, the polls also indicate at least one of the community's fears. The reaction to the possibil- ity of Hong Kong becoming a Special Economic Zone of China, or part perhaps of a larger SEZ, was relatively luke-warm.
Suggestions that a special administration might be devised for Hong Kong as a special zone of China are received in the Colony with unease. Many Hong Kong businessmen have had the chance to witness the setting up of an SEZ at close quarters that around Shum Chun just over the border, in which substan- tial Hong Kong capital has been invested. What they have observed of the teething troubles has not been wholly encouraging; one banker reportedly described the zone as “a shambles". These are early days, and Hong Kong still wishes these enterprises well and is happy to have a chance to help get them going. But the prospect of the territory itself being specially zoned is evidently unalluring.
The chief fear is that as a special zone, or worse still as part of a larger zone, Hong Kong would be weakened as an entity: that its frontiers and the size of its population would tend to pass from its own control; that even its currency would be at risk. Such fears have not sprung up overnight; hints from China several years ago that Hong Kong could easily accommodate a population of eight million or so, that living standards in Hong Kong would in time "merge" with those in nearby areas of China as the latter rose, caused a similar unease. SEZs have in short a ring of uncertainty to them--the biggest uncertainty being the question to what power the administration would be answerable. Would it work to London, or to Peking?
It is not surprising then that Hong Kong found no comfort in repeated suggestions in recent months that Article 30 of China's new draft constitution, providing for special administrations in select areas, was relevant to Hong Kong's future. Equally confusing and disquieting were the portmanteau references to the problems of "Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan". It might make sense in Peking to lump what the Chinese leaders regard as the "separated brethren" together. Hong Kong found only ambiguity and clouded omens in being bracketed (a) with a small territory (pop. 300,000) whose status was supposed to have been settled by a Sino-Portuguese treaty; and (b) a large
Prospects for Hong Kong
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island some 100 miles off the coast whose 18 million inhabitants seem at present reluctant to consider even a loose tributary relationship with the People's Republic.
Hong Kong has other fears that relate not to China but to the United Kingdom. The Nationality Act of 1980, under which most of the citizens of Hong Kong are recategorised as just that--meaning that none but a few thousand would have a right to settle in Britain—has been greeted in Hong Kong with resentment and suspicion. It is easy to understand the resentment.13 The suspicion is centred on a feeling that Britain is now in process of cutting its commitments to Hong Kong, hedging against a possible failure of the negotia- tions. It is widely believed that London has already set its face against any amorphous or ill-defined status for Hong Kong and that if China presses any "dog's breakfast" package, in which the loose ends are not firmly tied, the British might exercise an ultimate option: withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997 or even earlier.
This brief summary of some of the doubts and fears that press now on Hong Kong may suffice to suggest that the predicament calls for sympathy: that anyone who writes off the community as "panicky" could well examine his own likely degree of concern if comparable uncertainties hung over his motherland. The fears will persist until the negotiations show some signs of progress, and Hong Kong as it enters 1983 is fully aware of a rough ride ahead. Sir Edward Youde spoke of a "step by step" process of negotiation-with reassurance to be expected in stages. We must now examine how these stages could be reached, and what sort of settlement might emerge.
OBSCURITIES AND OBSTACLES:
HOW A SETTLEMENT COULD TAKE SHAPE
Following a year in which much happened to obscure the likely basis for an agreed solution to the problem of Hong Kong, a clear perception of that basis requires an effort of rediscovery. During the run-up to the negotiations, obser- vers' eyes were caught by many statements and reports which related closely to the public adoption of bargaining positions but which varied considerably in their relevance to the likely substantive areas of agreement and disagreement. Posturing and kite-flying were discernible: statements were made not only to impress the other side in the talks but also to rally the speaker's own. Public and party opinion in two countries were much in spokesmen's minds, and some utterances sought to win the attention of third and fourth parties.
If China has been the source of most such statements and hints, it must be pointed out that the Chinese leadership—had there been no pressure from Hong Kong and (on Hong Kong's behalf) from Britain for a start to discus- sions-would almost certainly have been content to stay silent on the future of the territory. China's basic position had already been declared, and to start considering commitments for 1997 involves an awkwardly long period ahead for politicians to contemplate. (In fact the Chinese leaders, like their British counterparts, may well have wished that the end-of-the-century calendar did
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