16
The Institute for the Study of Co... xt
reaching of agreement with China would be a "step by step” process; it would certainly not be achieved "in one go”.
Despite the need for these cautions and admonitions, to suggest that Hong Kong fell into a panic would be misleading. The three main indicators cited as indicating a crisis of confidence require the coolest scrutiny.
Not surprisingly, property prices11 and rents fell sharply, particularly in the New Territories, where some values declined by as much as 40 per cent; but the property market as a whole was acknowledged to have already been noticeably "overheated". Next, it is true that the fall in the exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar in the second half of the year pointed to a shift of capital; but how much of this actually left the Colony is far from clear. Thirdly, the substantial drop in share prices between 6 August and 4 October 1982—from over 1,160 points on the Hang Seng Index to just above 800-undoubtedly reflected nervousness preceding Mrs Thatcher's visit to China and disappointment dur- ing and after it. But there were other causes also, among them the deepening impact of world recession on forecasts of growth rates in the region; for Hong Kong the prediction dropped from nine per cent to around four. For real panic selling one has to look back to the collapse of 1973, when the index slumped from over 1,750 points to nearly 200.
One must also note that the wilder public comments and speculations came not from the majority that can claim to be part of Hong Kong's workforce, but from outsiders or a transient element on the fringe. It was indeed towards the latter that Mr Sales's strictures were directed.
In short, a distinction must be drawn between speculation and scaremonger- ing on the one hand and a natural and genuine concern for the future of the territory on the other. Hong Kong cannot be expected to take a detached view of things attached as it is to China, geographically; to Britain as a present dependency; and to the “here and now" compulsions of its financial, commer- cial and industrial role. It has every reason to want assurances about its future as soon as possible. And its citizens have every right--unpleasing though this may be to China-to give voice to their own aspirations and preferences. Such at least is the declared opinion of two people as disparate as Lord MacLehose (speaking in London in July 1982) and the Labour MP Mr Robert Parry (in Hong Kong in August 1982).
Anything in the nature of an official plebiscite has been, and remains, ruled out. The process itself would be offensive to China; and its results, whatever form it took, would predictably add to the offence. For a large majority of the people of Hong Kong have, in a sense, voted already: about three million, who were born in China, by migrating to Hong Kong; and a further two and a half million more Chinese, born in the Colony, by showing little or no indication of any wish to return permanently, at least at present, to their places of family origin.
Those hundreds of thousands who poured in across the border in the late 1940s and early 1950s were called refugees, since most were regarded as fugitives from a system that they disliked or feared. Those who have entered in more recent years—for example, during the big surge of 1978-80-have been called immigrants (illegal immigrants most of them), for their motivation has
The Prospects for Hong Kong
17
been regarded as essentially economic, their aim a chance to live better materially. The validity of the two categorisations is open to question. But the conclusion that nearly all the Chinese now in Hong Kong have opted, for one reason or another, to live there rather than in the People's Republic, is beyond doubt.
Opinion polls
While a referendum has been taboo, the views of various organisations have been aired. Of the public opinion polls, two, conducted by reputable firms and commissioned by groups that have not been backward in criticising Hong Kong government policies in the past, deserve mention.
Each poll covered a sample of about 1,000 adults. One, carried out on behalf of the Reform Club of Hong Kong, a body to which some elected members of the Urban Council belong, found that “maintenance of the status quo" was the "preferred outcome” for 70 per cent of those questioned, while a further 15 p
5 per cent also opted for a continued British administration under a "trust territory" arrangement to be agreed with China (as sovereign power) for a minimum of 30 years. That the territory should be taken back by China and placed under Chinese administration was the preference of four per cent.
The second poll was commissioned by the Hong Kong Observers, a group that describes itself as consisting of “about 30 concerned Hong Kong people from various walks of life, including lawyers, educators, journalists and business executives"; since its founding in 1977 the group, all of whose members are believed to be Chinese, has made a name for itself through its public criticisms of government in the columns of the largest English-language daily. The five possible solutions which were presented to test their “acceptability” included: "retention of the status quo"-which 95 per cent found acceptable; Hong Kong to remain under British administration with sovereignty belonging to China-64 per cent; and Hong Kong to be a Special Economic Zone of China-42 per cent. The possibility of "returning Hong Kong to China”, a phrase which seems capable of applying either to sovereignty only or to sovereignty plus administration, was acceptable to 26 per cent.
The fallibility of opinion polls is proverbial, and in Hong Kong they are likely to be at least as fallible as elsewhere. But the results of these two polls, and the projection of the figures across the population, command attention for several reasons. First, no one has suggested that they were conducted other than scrupulously and objectively. Second, the replies given to other questions-on the adequacy, for example, of public housing, of transport facilities and of measures to contain crime-expressed such a strong measure of dissatisfaction as seemingly to preclude the selection of a "tame" sample. Thirdly, on ques- tions relating to the future of Hong Kong, it is difficult to imagine why any respondent, once assured of anonymity and confidentiality, should have any motive for deceiving himself or misleading others.
It would be a mistake to read into these two surveys more than the questions and answers reveal. In particular, there is no reason for labelling the findings as either "pro-Britain” or “anti-China". The preference for a continuation of the
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.