14
The Institute for the Study of Co
overall advantage continues (despite, for example, a £249 million deficit on visible trade in 1979).
"I think Britain does quite well [out of Hong Kong]", the Hong Kong Commissioner in London, Sir Jack Cater, said in 1981 in an interview, and he gave the reminder that "small though we are, we import from Britain more than Japan imports from Britain. We import something like two-and-a-half to three times what China does from Britain". Further, "we have given some of the biggest orders ever to British industry in this past year”.
If account is taken of other factors, like the base that Hong Kong still provides for British exporters to China and to the region, like the commercial advantage conferred by Britain's control of airline routage, it is evident that the United Kingdom indeed "does quite well”.
It would be naive to imagine that the British negotiatiors will not bear in mind the desirability of retaining such advantages, or replacing them with compen- satory ones, when it comes to discussing the possibilities for new or interim or transitional arrangements for Hong Kong. Any inhibitions about pressing such a case would certainly surprise their Chinese opposite numbers, who will be nothing if not realists in such matters. As for British public opinion, surely any failure to get the best deal available could be popularly construed as a matter of impeachable neglect or at least as a dereliction punishable at the polls. So this consideration also will have a bearing on Britain's part in the negotiations.
Third, there is the obligation that Britain has, as a negotiator, to speak not only for itself but also for Hong Kong-to reflect the community's wishes and aspirations and to press the community's cause vigorously. This obligation has been publicly and emphatically accepted-notably by Mrs Thatcher when she answered questions in Hong Kong following her visit to China. But how real and how strong will the sense of obligation be?
While it would be starry-eyed to believe that this factor will be the dominant motivation in the British pursuit of a settlement, outweighing the other two influences, it would be excessively cynical to regard this obligation as likely to be totally subordinated to Britain's concept of its own interest.
There is no doubt that for Britain the obligation is a real one, genuinely felt and to be pursued in earnest. This statement, to a worried and sceptical Hong Kong merchant, might convey the sound of pious hopes rather than solid assurances. But it is underpinned by two strong factual props. First, Hong Kong has a proven record of effectiveness in making sure that its voice is heard and heeded in London. Secondly, there is the very large area of identity of views between the sort of future Britain would like to secure for Hong Kong and the future that Hong Kong envisages as best for itself.
Britain certainly does have some firm and positive views about its capacity to continue to contribute to-and gain from-economic growth in the South-East Asia/Pacific region and the vast modernisation programme on which the People's Republic has embarked. Britain no longer sees itself as a Pacific power, and may in recent years have missed as many commercial chances as it seized in East Asia. But there is reason to believe that it is now more fully aware of the opportunities for trade and joint enterprises that the future is likely to bring in countries around the Pacific Basin.
T
Prospects for Hong Kong
15
Pride and satisfaction must also be taken into account-both in respect of British relations with China and of Britain's responsibility for Hong Kong. In the periods 1948-50 and 1966–77, despite the aggravations arising respectively from the outcome of civil war in China and the Cultural Revolution, Britain calmly and admirably persisted in regarding relations with China as something well worth striving to improve.
As regards Hong Kong, the record speaks for itself. If the harbour and the people are Hong Kong's two prime assets, the United Kingdom is entitled to reflect, first, that it was largely British technical skills that have turned the harbour into one of the world's busiest and most efficient ports; and, secondly, that British administrative skills have helped to make the harbour-city a place of magnetic attraction to multitudes of people not only in southern China but in many neighbouring countries of South-East Asia.
More important than pride, however, is the fact that Britain's capacity to play an effective and positive role in the region and vis-à-vis China will be enorm- ously enhanced by, and arguably dependent on, the survival in Hong Kong of those facilities that now so well serve British purposes, those of many other trading nations and the interests of Hong Kong itself. When we consider the standpoint of the people of the territory it will be apparent that their hopes are ones that Britain shares and that realisation of their fears would be a serious setback for British aims and intentions.
HONG KONG'S NEED OF A SIGN: WHAT IT WANTS, AND WHAT IT FEARS
Hong Kong did not present its best, or its truest, face to the world in 1982. An observer striving to read such diverse local indices as stock exchange move- ments, currency fluctuations, growth forecasts, land sales, interpretative reports and editorials in the press, and (something new for Hong Kong in a political context) a flurry of opinion polls, could have reflected that the Colony was living down to the neat but unkindly sobriquet "borrowed place, borrowed time".
As the months passed, and brought forth from China not the assurances so keenly awaited but "noises" that seemed at best ambivalent, at worst sinister, so the impression grew abroad of a jittery and impermanent society. The biblical reference to "a generation that sought after a sign" came to some minds; another comparison, less friendly still, was the imagined scene of panic in an illegal but well patronised gambling casino as fears grew of an impending closure raid by the police.
In September 1982 a leading citizen, Mr A. de O. Sales, a former chairman of the Urban Council, was moved to call for a pause in speculation, counselling that, when it came to protecting and furthering Hong Kong's prospects, resi- dents would do better to concentrate on "hard work" instead of distractive hypothesising. His advice was in line with warnings, voiced by officials through- out the summer, against excessive expectations of a resounding pledge from Peking. Most explicit was the statement by Sir Edward Youde, when he returned from a visit to Guangdong Province in August, that he thought the
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.