TNAG-1041-FCO40-1291-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 43

DSR 11C

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visit injects a new factor.

Both he and the Ambassador would

therefore like me to give to the Chinese a fairly full

exposé of the legal problems connected with 1997 and in ho

emphasise

particular to-explain the difficulties caused by the ending

of British administration in the New Territories in 1997.

7. In my view, this would be going too far. Even if I were

to put forward ideas on the basis that the Chinese might

chew them over before the Prime Minister's visit there would

a risk of their turning them down on the spot, particularly

if they get the idea that we were trying to bounce them into

agreeing now to our staying on beyond 1997. I think therefor

that I should adopt a fairly low key approach, repeating

what you said in April and expanding on this judiciously

if the Chinese prove receptive. I should certainly not

put to them any proposals forta solution. Quite apart from

anything else we do not want to commit the Prime Minister

before she has studied the matter fully.

8.

I attach two drafts:

a) a re-drafted letter from you to the Prime Minister;

b) a draft of the line I should take in Peking,

subject of course to amendment in the light

of the Prime Minister's views.

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