TNAG-1041-FCO40-1291-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 42

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4. However, I do not think that it would be right for

your letter to the Prime Minister to go as far as the

original draft.. In particular, it should not put a draft OD

paper to her at this stage. The latter raises major question

of substance on Hong Kong which the Prime Minister would

certainly wish to take time to consider. This applies

particularly to a possible concession to the Chinese on

sovereignty over Hong Kong. In my view it would be best to

take two bites at this exercise. and to submit to her on the

substantive issues after my visit, parhaps with the idea of

putting an OD paper to colleagues in the Spring.

5.

.

If Mrs Thatcher agrees now to a September visit, we

need to work out what I should say to the Chinese in Peking

about Hong Kong. As always in dealing with this problem, we

Queston have to steer a careful course between keeping the problem

in their minds and appearing to make premature proposals

which might invite a rebuff. Obviously I should at the

least recall what you said to Deng Xiaoping and others

Bur

last April. We know that the Chinese are very reluctant

to come to grips with this problem. We cannot tell when the

will be ready for substantive discussions.

6. The Ambassador in Peking would like us to aim for a

fairly strong pitch possibly even leading to negotiations

during the Prime Minister's visit and for him to give clear

advance notice to the Chinese that we hoped to make progress

then. The Governor of Hong Kong believes that we should

move more cautiously ideally he would favour leaving the

problem until weakening confidence in Hong Kong forces the

However

Chinese to talk. He recognises that the Prime Minister's

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