DSR 11C
SECRET
-3-
visit injects a new factor.
Both he and the Ambassador would
therefore like me to give to the Chinese a fairly full
exposé of the legal problems connected with 1997 and in ho
emphasise
particular to-explain the difficulties caused by the ending
of British administration in the New Territories in 1997.
7. In my view, this would be going too far. Even if I were
to put forward ideas on the basis that the Chinese might
chew them over before the Prime Minister's visit there would
a risk of their turning them down on the spot, particularly
if they get the idea that we were trying to bounce them into
agreeing now to our staying on beyond 1997. I think therefor
that I should adopt a fairly low key approach, repeating
what you said in April and expanding on this judiciously
if the Chinese prove receptive. I should certainly not
put to them any proposals forta solution. Quite apart from
anything else we do not want to commit the Prime Minister
before she has studied the matter fully.
8.
I attach two drafts:
a) a re-drafted letter from you to the Prime Minister;
b) a draft of the line I should take in Peking,
subject of course to amendment in the light
of the Prime Minister's views.
SECRET