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4. However, I do not think that it would be right for
your letter to the Prime Minister to go as far as the
original draft.. In particular, it should not put a draft OD
paper to her at this stage. The latter raises major question
of substance on Hong Kong which the Prime Minister would
certainly wish to take time to consider. This applies
particularly to a possible concession to the Chinese on
sovereignty over Hong Kong. In my view it would be best to
take two bites at this exercise. and to submit to her on the
substantive issues after my visit, parhaps with the idea of
putting an OD paper to colleagues in the Spring.
5.
.
If Mrs Thatcher agrees now to a September visit, we
need to work out what I should say to the Chinese in Peking
about Hong Kong. As always in dealing with this problem, we
Queston have to steer a careful course between keeping the problem
in their minds and appearing to make premature proposals
which might invite a rebuff. Obviously I should at the
least recall what you said to Deng Xiaoping and others
Bur
last April. We know that the Chinese are very reluctant
to come to grips with this problem. We cannot tell when the
will be ready for substantive discussions.
6. The Ambassador in Peking would like us to aim for a
fairly strong pitch possibly even leading to negotiations
during the Prime Minister's visit and for him to give clear
advance notice to the Chinese that we hoped to make progress
then. The Governor of Hong Kong believes that we should
move more cautiously ideally he would favour leaving the
problem until weakening confidence in Hong Kong forces the
However
Chinese to talk. He recognises that the Prime Minister's
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