TNAG-0894-FCO40-1104-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 22

CONFIDENTIAL 2.

Processing Centres/Transit Centres (Brief No 4)

9.

Transit centres as suggested by ASEAN have limited value, but if large enough could sympathetically ease pressure at the point of

arrival. A UN island does not seem practical. Centres in Vietnam

may be an element in orderly departure (see Brief 5 and para

but pose serious problems and should be opposed.

below)

But it

UNHCR/Vietnam Agreement and Orderly Departure (Brief No 5)

10. The 30 May agreement will not stop the refugee flood.

may if suitably expanded and with certain important safeguards, open

the way to regulating the flow of refugees and eventually

eliminating the dangers of the small boat passage.

Maritime Aspects (Brief No 6)

11. Various measures could be agreed at the conference designed to

strengthen existing principles and improve them where necessary.

The UK has produced a consultative paper but a national brief

provides further guidance.

Further action against Vietnam (Brief No 7)

12.

Further political and economic steps against Vietnam are

possible, but will need coordination with likeminded countries to

have serious effect. Japan and Sweden, still major bilateral donors

could be influential.

Land Refugees (Brief No 8)

The

13. The position in Thailand, with 160,000 Lao and some Cambodian

refugees, is serious. There is a risk of famine i in Cambodia.

Lack of a widely accented regime in Cambodia makes deliver of

humanitarian aid very difficult.

CONFIDENTIAL