CONFIDENTIAL 2.
Processing Centres/Transit Centres (Brief No 4)
9.
Transit centres as suggested by ASEAN have limited value, but if large enough could sympathetically ease pressure at the point of
arrival. A UN island does not seem practical. Centres in Vietnam
may be an element in orderly departure (see Brief 5 and para
but pose serious problems and should be opposed.
below)
But it
UNHCR/Vietnam Agreement and Orderly Departure (Brief No 5)
10. The 30 May agreement will not stop the refugee flood.
may if suitably expanded and with certain important safeguards, open
the way to regulating the flow of refugees and eventually
eliminating the dangers of the small boat passage.
Maritime Aspects (Brief No 6)
11. Various measures could be agreed at the conference designed to
strengthen existing principles and improve them where necessary.
The UK has produced a consultative paper but a national brief
provides further guidance.
Further action against Vietnam (Brief No 7)
12.
Further political and economic steps against Vietnam are
possible, but will need coordination with likeminded countries to
have serious effect. Japan and Sweden, still major bilateral donors
could be influential.
Land Refugees (Brief No 8)
The
13. The position in Thailand, with 160,000 Lao and some Cambodian
refugees, is serious. There is a risk of famine i in Cambodia.
Lack of a widely accented regime in Cambodia makes deliver of
humanitarian aid very difficult.
CONFIDENTIAL