TNAG-0716-FCO40-912-Air-hijacking-and-the-Dependent-Territories-1978 — Page 28

CONFIDENTIAL

with which we have bilateral air service agreements, if they are

parties to the Tokyo, Montreal and Hague Conventions?

7. How would we justify taking action against guilty countries,

with which we have bilateral air service agreements, if they are

not parties to the Conventions? Which countries are these? Should

we renegotiate such ASAs?

8.

Should we seek to include in new air service agreements a

special clause permitting action against a guilty country? What

should that clause say?

9. Does the Statement conflict with multilateral agreements (the

Chicago Convention, IASTA any others)?

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10. The 1973 Special ICAO Assembly in Rome rejected a UK/Swiss

proposal which would have had the effect of denying over-flying

rights to an airline of a State not acting in conformity with

The Hague and Montreal Conventions. Opposition was on the grounds

that collective sanctions could be imposed only with the authority

of the Security Counsel. Would opposition to the action foreseen in

this Statement be justified on similar grounds?

Risks of Retaliation

11. What are the risks that guilty countries against which action

'is..taken will retaliate, eg by banning overflights by Club countries

(civil and military)?

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/12.