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with which we have bilateral air service agreements, if they are
parties to the Tokyo, Montreal and Hague Conventions?
7. How would we justify taking action against guilty countries,
with which we have bilateral air service agreements, if they are
not parties to the Conventions? Which countries are these? Should
we renegotiate such ASAs?
8.
Should we seek to include in new air service agreements a
special clause permitting action against a guilty country? What
should that clause say?
9. Does the Statement conflict with multilateral agreements (the
Chicago Convention, IASTA any others)?
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10. The 1973 Special ICAO Assembly in Rome rejected a UK/Swiss
proposal which would have had the effect of denying over-flying
rights to an airline of a State not acting in conformity with
The Hague and Montreal Conventions. Opposition was on the grounds
that collective sanctions could be imposed only with the authority
of the Security Counsel. Would opposition to the action foreseen in
this Statement be justified on similar grounds?
Risks of Retaliation
11. What are the risks that guilty countries against which action
'is..taken will retaliate, eg by banning overflights by Club countries
(civil and military)?
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/12.