TNAG-0616-FCO40-764-Policy-of-UK-on-status-of-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 70

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11C

35.

Against this background, there are broadly four

options for British policy in relation to arms sales to

China

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wave lifere celak

(a) to avoid selling (equipment to China which-might

Which might be be militarily useful and therefore (difficult to get

through COCOM;

icult

(b) to promote arms sales within the limits of what

the British Government believe to be acceptable in

strategic terms, and to seek COCOM agreement to such

!

sales and abide by the result;

(c) as in (b) above but in the last resort going

ahead despite opposition in COCOM and from our partner

(a) to promote arms sales without regard to the

results of consultations in COCOM or with our partners

ceal

37. The only serious strategic objection to defence sales

to China identified in this paper would be if such sales

increased China's capabilitjes as a regional power credible

seriously to threaten her neighbours. Many arms sales will

fall short of this or will do no more than delay the

achievement of such capability, which will in any case be

constrained by China's concentration on internal economic

development and concern with the threat from the Soviet

Union. On the other hand, other states in the region and

the United States, which still has defence commitments

there, may have different perceptions which it would be

wrong not to take into account. Moreover, Britain has a

strong interest in the maintenance of COCOM against the

/Soviet Union

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