CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
35.
Against this background, there are broadly four
options for British policy in relation to arms sales to
China
clik
wave lifere celak
(a) to avoid selling (equipment to China which-might
Which might be be militarily useful and therefore (difficult to get
through COCOM;
icult
(b) to promote arms sales within the limits of what
the British Government believe to be acceptable in
strategic terms, and to seek COCOM agreement to such
!
sales and abide by the result;
(c) as in (b) above but in the last resort going
ahead despite opposition in COCOM and from our partner
(a) to promote arms sales without regard to the
results of consultations in COCOM or with our partners
ceal
37. The only serious strategic objection to defence sales
to China identified in this paper would be if such sales
increased China's capabilitjes as a regional power credible
seriously to threaten her neighbours. Many arms sales will
fall short of this or will do no more than delay the
achievement of such capability, which will in any case be
constrained by China's concentration on internal economic
development and concern with the threat from the Soviet
Union. On the other hand, other states in the region and
the United States, which still has defence commitments
there, may have different perceptions which it would be
wrong not to take into account. Moreover, Britain has a
strong interest in the maintenance of COCOM against the
/Soviet Union
CONFIDENTIAL
D 107991 400,000 7/76 904 953