TNAG-0616-FCO40-764-Policy-of-UK-on-status-of-Hong-Kong-1977 — Page 71

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DSR 11C

Soviet Union and would damage its own interests if it

defied the United States by going ahead with a sale despite COCOM and to which the Americans objected strongly The United States is in fact the key.

ve worked on

the porners

1-

cocom whet desert cactully + us remotions.

38. Against this background, options (a) and (d) above

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can be excluded. Options (b) and (c) are similar, the

main difference being that in one the UK should be prepared to push further than COCOM and our partners would countenance in the hope that they would acquiesce in a fait accompli. In principle option (b) is the preferable one, accommodating as it would most of our interests. Whether to proceed to option (c) in individual cases would

However be a matter for judgment et the time. It might be importar to keep in reserve the right to proceed anyway as a means inducing reluctant partners to agree to changes in the COCO

to be

16

·

(c)

blarga boy bothande

rules which we believe/justified on their merits. Oph might herefore be

кум reserve; and whether to be a matter of pudgment an

he time. 39. If this analysis is accepted, it will be necessary for

ise the pokes Gen HMG to consult the Americans at an early stage of Chinese

Any item o

and the

serious interest in British defence equipment. Consider-

ation will also need to be given to how far China's

tens

interest in particular defence equipment should be

stimulated or allowed to develop in advance of consultation

with the Americans. It may be possible to identify a

range of equipment which would fall well within the guide-

line we set ourselves (that it should not increase

significantly Chinese offensive capability) in which we

might solicit Chinese interest.

such equipment is at Annex

A preliminary list of

For equipment which

/clearly

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