TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 148

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Can these forces be disaggregated with reference to the distances at which they operate from the shores of the UK, e.g. coastal operations, operations within air defence cover from the European mainland and the UK, and operations outside such air defence cover? Or with reference to the roles

e.g. anti- submarine, anti-surface ship, merchant shipping protection - which Britain should seek to play in NATO's maritime strategy by contribution either of surface ships, submarines or aircraft?

To preserve maximum flexibility to meet unforeseen commitments (especially Northern Ireland) should not the Army think seriously about restricting itself so as to rely less on heavy' tanks (even on the Central Front), and more on infantry with good (and cheap) anti-tank and low-level air defence capability?

If Britain abandoned its worldwide role and concentrated on defence in Europe, should this not have a marked effect on most support elements, enabling the Ministry of Defence to assume perhaps arbitrarily that a significant part of any savings could come in time from support elements rather than from cuts in the front line?

To have an effective Navy should we not have submarines supported by small fast surface vessels rather than a bit of everything and, therefore, nothing which is really effective?

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cannot the task be

What is the role of strategic air mobility carried out in periods of tension, and even hostility - by civil aviation? To the Central Region? To the Flanks?

With the possibility that the defence budget may have to be reduced by more than a third compared with the Long Term Costings programme as submitted, does not the proportion of the Procurement budget accounted for by R & D need fundamental review? If so, on what criteria do the MOD propose to do this?

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