TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 147

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How is the ratio manpower cost/equipment cost estimated to vary between 1974 and 1980?

Will the Steering Committee get an overall Defence view of the right mix of forces at each level of resources set out in the terms of reference, in contradistinction to a pro rata reduction in all three Services?

What are the arguments for the MOD's planning to spend £42 million a year, primarily to maintain internal security in Hong Kong? Why should not the Hong Kong Government meet the full cost if the commitment to maintain internal security and ? identify external aggression has to remain? Alternatively, why

could not the commitment be met by a reduced garrison paid for by the Hong Kong Government with reinforcement from the UK by the Westabout route using civil air transport?

What is the military and political justification, in the early 1980's and beyond, for Britain retaining force commitments to CENTO (and, incidentally replacing them with new equipment)?

If, as seems inevitable, the resource guidelines will necessitate serious MOD examination of components from the major UK contributions to NATO, in what order of defence priority will the MOD place these contributions, e.g. as between the Northern and Southern Flanks; defence in the maritime area; the strategic and tactical air battle; the Central Front; the defence of the shores, air space and land mass of the UK itself?

How important is it nationally and from the point of view of NATO as a whole for Britain to remain in Cyprus (CENTO commitments apart), Malta and Gibraltar? If Britain must stay in any of these bases, why should not our Allies take over the responsibility for what is not primarily a high priority British national interest?

Notwithstanding the genuine argument that the bulk of naval, land and air forces are flexible and capable of being used for a variety of purposes, how can they be divided up so that Ministers can discuss the defence and political implications of reducing these forces (not necessarily pro rata) to confine the defence

Is it sensible budget within the resource guidelines laid down?

for Ministers to cut these capabilities, if they feel they must, by means of arbitrary reductions in finance, manpower, whole weapon systems or numbers of such systems? If not, what alternatives can the Ministry of Defence suggest?