TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 109

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Oman

(viii)

Option Al would be seriously damaging with the

Americans, Iranians and the moderate Arabs, including the

Saudis. It could thus have an effect on our relations with

the oil producing countries. It could also have a considerable

effect on our ability to get major contracts in the Middle East,

and it would put at risk the future of the present relatively

progressive regime in Oman. It would also involve the

abandonment (or expensive reprovisioning) of important

intelligence and broadcasting facilities. Option A2 avoids

these difficulties and involves no more risk than our present

policy in the Gulf.

The Gulf

(1x)

Option A1 involves, but to a lesser degree, the same

risks as in the case of Oman. We should not expect to pay

any significant penalty for the withdrawal of the team in

Sharjah and, therefore, Option A2 would involve approximately

the same risks as our present policy.

CENTO

(x)

Option A1 would be extremely damaging, particularly with

the Shah and to a lesser extent with the Americans. The former

might in retaliation take steps in a number of fields which

actively hurt British interests. Option A2 also involves a

risk with the Shah but probably not a significant risk with

the other members of CENTO or with the Americans. The Shah's

displeasure, however, would be on a lower scale than in the case

of A1 and might not amount to a great deal if the decision could

be presented to him in the best possible framework.

J11

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