TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 108

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Five Power consultative commitment, attributing lesser and

varying degrees of importance to our retaining some sort of

military presence in the area, but recognising that this was

likely to be minimal. Accordingly they would be prepared to

acquiesce in something like Option A2.

Indian Ocean

(v) The risks in any reductions here are that we shall annoy

the Americans and give additional openings to the Russians,

especially in Mauritius.

There is also a risk to the protection

of general British interests including the trade routes. The

costs involved in the area are small.

that we would incur the full risks:

Option A1 would mean

Option A2 would involve

a small risk that the Russians might supplant us in Gan.

Closure

of our facilities there might be welcome to the Maldivian Government

who want to use it for tourist purposes. HMG would be under

pressure to run the airfield in Gan as a charge on Technical

Assistance Funds.

SEATO

(vi)

There is no effective difference between the options

here but A1 would underline our total withdrawal from South-East

Asia and would be unwelcome to several States in the area and

to the US.

South Korea

(vii) The saving is very small and in the long run there is

no difference between the options but under A2 we would hope

to delay an announcement until the United National Command had

been in practice abolished. This might happen as a result of

this year's UN General Assembly or the forthcoming South Korean/US

talks on the subject.

D

J10

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