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Oman
(viii)
Option Al would be seriously damaging with the
Americans, Iranians and the moderate Arabs, including the
Saudis. It could thus have an effect on our relations with
the oil producing countries. It could also have a considerable
effect on our ability to get major contracts in the Middle East,
and it would put at risk the future of the present relatively
progressive regime in Oman. It would also involve the
abandonment (or expensive reprovisioning) of important
intelligence and broadcasting facilities. Option A2 avoids
these difficulties and involves no more risk than our present
policy in the Gulf.
The Gulf
(1x)
Option A1 involves, but to a lesser degree, the same
risks as in the case of Oman. We should not expect to pay
any significant penalty for the withdrawal of the team in
Sharjah and, therefore, Option A2 would involve approximately
the same risks as our present policy.
CENTO
(x)
Option A1 would be extremely damaging, particularly with
the Shah and to a lesser extent with the Americans. The former
might in retaliation take steps in a number of fields which
actively hurt British interests. Option A2 also involves a
risk with the Shah but probably not a significant risk with
the other members of CENTO or with the Americans. The Shah's
displeasure, however, would be on a lower scale than in the case
of A1 and might not amount to a great deal if the decision could
be presented to him in the best possible framework.
J11
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