TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 107

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on the other hand believe that those considerations should

predispose the Hong Kong Government to make the substantial

increase in the defence contribution nccessary for the retention

Sorial to extendline? of the UK garrison.

Brunel

(11)

The Brunei Government would stubbornly oppose a decision

to withdraw, but should not be surprised. The Shell Company's

interest is unlikely to be damaged. If we could contine to

provide loan Service personnel it would soften the blow.

Gurkhas

(iii) The recruitment of Gurkhas benefits Nepal economically

and socially. While the Nepalese Government would be unlikely

to object on political grounds, the loss of Gurkha foreign

exchange earnings would be a sever blow to Nepal and would

create a vacuum which the Chinese might be glad to fill. There

would also be social consequences to Nepal, among them the

resulting political risk of adding 7,000 trained troops to her

present high level of unemployed. For political reasons, there

fore, a decision to disband the Brigade of Gurkhas would probably

have to be accompanied by an offer of increased aid.

Singapore/Malaysia

(iv)

The effect on our Commonwealth partners of Option A1

would be profound. The Governments of the region, including

non-FFDA Governments, and the Americans would oppose complete

withdrawal believing that it is likely to contribute to

instability. Abandonment of our position would lessen our

influence and may have some effect on our investments and trade.

The credibility of HMG's belief in the Commonwealth connection

would be damaged. The four Governments recently consulted

attached very great importance to the continuation of the

JJ

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