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on the other hand believe that those considerations should
predispose the Hong Kong Government to make the substantial
increase in the defence contribution nccessary for the retention
Sorial to extendline? of the UK garrison.
Brunel
(11)
The Brunei Government would stubbornly oppose a decision
to withdraw, but should not be surprised. The Shell Company's
interest is unlikely to be damaged. If we could contine to
provide loan Service personnel it would soften the blow.
Gurkhas
(iii) The recruitment of Gurkhas benefits Nepal economically
and socially. While the Nepalese Government would be unlikely
to object on political grounds, the loss of Gurkha foreign
exchange earnings would be a sever blow to Nepal and would
create a vacuum which the Chinese might be glad to fill. There
would also be social consequences to Nepal, among them the
resulting political risk of adding 7,000 trained troops to her
present high level of unemployed. For political reasons, there
fore, a decision to disband the Brigade of Gurkhas would probably
have to be accompanied by an offer of increased aid.
Singapore/Malaysia
(iv)
The effect on our Commonwealth partners of Option A1
would be profound. The Governments of the region, including
non-FFDA Governments, and the Americans would oppose complete
withdrawal believing that it is likely to contribute to
instability. Abandonment of our position would lessen our
influence and may have some effect on our investments and trade.
The credibility of HMG's belief in the Commonwealth connection
would be damaged. The four Governments recently consulted
attached very great importance to the continuation of the
JJ
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