TNAG-0295-FCO40-331-Long-term-study-of-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1971 — Page 27

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permit the withdrawal in good order of British troops and

"expatriates. In this latter case it would be vital however

to delay any substantive negotiation to as late a date as

possible so as to avoid the danger of panic and disastrous loss

of confidence in the Colony.

Course 4(c)(ii) and 4(c)(iii)

Seek to maintain present situation post-1997_or negotiate a new lease post-19977

If it became apparent following informal soundings which led

to the opening of negotiations with an amenable Chinese Govern-

ment that they would prefer to see Hong Kong's colonial status

maintained into the 21st century.

They might prefer to maintain

the legal status quo as we see it, or they might prefer to make

a lease on completely new terms. In either case they would

require of us certain concessions;

following forms:-

(a)

these might take one of the

Payment for the lease of the New Territories.

The

Government of Hong Kong would probably be willing to pay a

considerable sum if it were to mean the continuation of

their present status.

Such a rent could be nominal, fair

10.

(b)

or exorbitant.

We might agree, having retroceded our territory, to pay a

fair, or exorbitant rent for the whole territory which we

would continue to administer as a Colony.

Solution (b) above would be dependent upon a radical change in

the internal political scene within China of which there is at

best a very faint chance only.

There would clearly be some advantage from our point of view

in remaining in Hong Kong after 1997:-

/(a)

8

G

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