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permit the withdrawal in good order of British troops and
"expatriates. In this latter case it would be vital however
to delay any substantive negotiation to as late a date as
possible so as to avoid the danger of panic and disastrous loss
of confidence in the Colony.
Course 4(c)(ii) and 4(c)(iii)
Seek to maintain present situation post-1997_or negotiate a new lease post-19977
If it became apparent following informal soundings which led
to the opening of negotiations with an amenable Chinese Govern-
ment that they would prefer to see Hong Kong's colonial status
maintained into the 21st century.
They might prefer to maintain
the legal status quo as we see it, or they might prefer to make
a lease on completely new terms. In either case they would
require of us certain concessions;
following forms:-
(a)
these might take one of the
Payment for the lease of the New Territories.
The
Government of Hong Kong would probably be willing to pay a
considerable sum if it were to mean the continuation of
their present status.
Such a rent could be nominal, fair
10.
(b)
or exorbitant.
We might agree, having retroceded our territory, to pay a
fair, or exorbitant rent for the whole territory which we
would continue to administer as a Colony.
Solution (b) above would be dependent upon a radical change in
the internal political scene within China of which there is at
best a very faint chance only.
There would clearly be some advantage from our point of view
in remaining in Hong Kong after 1997:-
/(a)
8
G
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