TNAG-0295-FCO40-331-Long-term-study-of-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1971 — Page 28

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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11.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

This may be the only way of continuing for the time

being to look after the two million citizens of the

United Kingdom and Colonies who would otherwise pass

into the hands of the Communists.

The chance that if we hang on we might secure better

terms later.

We should continue to enjoy the advantages of Hong Kong

as a Far East base, as a China-watching post and as a

bargaining counter in negotiating Air Service Agreements

with other countries.

Provided the stability of the Colony is maintained it

will continue to be a substantial provider of sterling

for the reserves and of modest advantage to our balance

of payments generally.

On the other hand, there are arguments in support of an

orderly withdrawal in 1997, if this can be obtained.

(a) To remain voluntarily in Hong Kong would be to run

counter to one of the principles of post-war British

policy, that we should divest ourselves of our

remaining colonial responsibilities at a favourable

moment.

(b) By 1997 we should be fully integrated into the EEC.

Hong Kong would be an increasingly embarrassing

political anachronism.

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/(c)

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