TNAG-0295-FCO40-331-Long-term-study-of-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1971 — Page 21

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4. The options which appear open to us, though events cannot be

said to lie fully within our control, are broadly as follows:-

5.

(a)

(b)

maintain the status quo, either on the assumption

that the Chinese will be prepared to permit the

present situation to persist unaltered after 1997, or

simply because no other course of action seems feasible;

prepare a voluntary and negotiated withdrawal from the

whole Colony as soon as this can be arranged;

(c) maintain the status quo for the time being, and take

preliminary informal soundings with the Chinese Government

at a suitable time nearer 1997 with a view to:

negotiating an orderly withdrawal in 1997;

(i)

(ii) securing an indication from the Chinese that

they will not interfere with the present

arrangements after 1997; or

(iii) securing an indication from the Chinese that

they will agree to negotiate new terms for a

lease of the Colony.

Before deciding which of these options may be obtainable

there are certain factors to be stated:-

(a) There seems no likelihood of any negotiation with

the Chinese being feasible during the lifetime of Mao

Tse-tung; even afterwards it may not be possible.

(b)

The nearer we approach to 1997 the greater is the danger

of loss of confidence in Hong Kong. This could not only

result in the breakdown of the administration, but will

certainly mean that investment will fall off and the

industrial machine will run down. The result, relatively

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/quickly,