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4. The options which appear open to us, though events cannot be
said to lie fully within our control, are broadly as follows:-
5.
(a)
(b)
maintain the status quo, either on the assumption
that the Chinese will be prepared to permit the
present situation to persist unaltered after 1997, or
simply because no other course of action seems feasible;
prepare a voluntary and negotiated withdrawal from the
whole Colony as soon as this can be arranged;
(c) maintain the status quo for the time being, and take
preliminary informal soundings with the Chinese Government
at a suitable time nearer 1997 with a view to:
negotiating an orderly withdrawal in 1997;
(i)
(ii) securing an indication from the Chinese that
they will not interfere with the present
arrangements after 1997; or
(iii) securing an indication from the Chinese that
they will agree to negotiate new terms for a
lease of the Colony.
Before deciding which of these options may be obtainable
there are certain factors to be stated:-
(a) There seems no likelihood of any negotiation with
the Chinese being feasible during the lifetime of Mao
Tse-tung; even afterwards it may not be possible.
(b)
The nearer we approach to 1997 the greater is the danger
of loss of confidence in Hong Kong. This could not only
result in the breakdown of the administration, but will
certainly mean that investment will fall off and the
industrial machine will run down. The result, relatively
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/quickly,