TNAG-0061-FCO40-97-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 108

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appropriate time to consider what might be Hong Kong's contribution

to the military requirements there after our withdrawal from

Singapore is complete.

16.

I must advise against any attempt how to obtain an advance

commitment from Hong Kong to a higher contribution.

Because

devaluation has led to a loss of some £30 million in the value of

Hong Kong's official reserves ( a factor that could well affect

the pace of development of the social services), this is not a

propitious time to be seeking a higher contribution to H.M.Exchequer.

Nor can we now determine what Hong Kong will be in a position to

pay after 1971; for example one of the factors we shall have to

consider is the resources that the Colony may thenhave to devote

(as much from political necessity as from reasons of enlightened

policy) to the improvement and expansion of much needed social

services.

17. I must also advise against an approach which makes the size

of the military forces we are prepared to maintain there dependent

upon the level of contribution;

imposing a rate of contribution.

to the Sa

or which talks in terms of

Both would be the height of

political folly, would play into the hands of the local communists,

18.

In taking a view now, for planning purposes, of the minimum

forces we shall need to maintain our position in Hong Kong after

1971 we should make no other financial assumptions than that

will comtime to contribute

Provided

Given that Hong Kong's economy

'on a scale no less

is in any other

Adria

continues to grow at a satisfactory

rate I think we can hope and expect a

higher rate of contribution in the

years ahead.

( which will depend on the security situation),

the measure of

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