TNAG-0061-FCO40-97-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 107

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defence and internal security is unrealistic in the circumstances

of Hong Kong. The external and internal threats to the Colony

are from the same source. If China wishes to bring pressure to

bear or take over the Colony we can be fairly certain that this

will be done by fomenting and exploiting an internal security

situation.

12. I entirely endorse a view expressed by the Foreign Secretary

in a letter to the Defence Secretary. He wrote: "I do not think

that it is realistic to seek to isolate a uniquely military

role for a services presence which insofar as it is indispensable

for the maintenance of morale and confidence in the Colony is a

buttress for our position in all its aspects.'

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13. We should not therefore rely on any such artificial division

of forces in reaching a decision as to what constitutes a proper

charge on Defence votes. Nor is it reasonable to expect Hong Kong

to contribute on that basis to the cost of the military forces we

consider it necessary to station there, particularly since the

increases now required are very largely a consequence of our

decision to withdraw from Singapore.

14. If it is considered that the dual role of our forces in Hong

Kong should in some way be reflected in Defence votes we might

consider whether, in the special circumstances of Hong Kong, a

proportion of the expenditure could be met from Commonwealth Office

(and eventually Foreign Office) votes. But the usual doctrine (that has stood the test of time) is that a Colony should contribute

to its own defence according to its capacity to pay; and it is on

this basis, I consider, that Hong Kong should continue to contribute.

15.

In cash and in services Hong Kong at present makes an annual

defence contribution of the order of £5 million a year under an

agreement concluded in December 1966 which runs until March 1971.

The contribution will be due for re negotiation in 1970, an

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/appropriate