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appropriate time to consider what might be Hong Kong's contribution
to the military requirements there after our withdrawal from
Singapore is complete.
Because
16. I must advise against any attempt how to obtain an advance
commitment from Hong Kong to a higher contribution.
devaluation has led to a loss of some £30 million in the value of
Hong Kong's official reserves ( a factor that could well affect
the pace of development of the social services), this is not a
propitious time to be seeking a higher contribution to H.M.Exchequer.
Nor can we now determine what Hong Kong will be in a position to
pay after 1971; for example one of the factors we shall have to
consider is the resources that the Colony may thenhave to devote
(as much from political necessity as from reasons of enlightened
policy) to the improvement and expansion of much needed social
services.
17. I must also advise against an approach which makes the size
of the military forces we are prepared to maintain there dependent
or which talks in terms of
upon the level of contribution;
imposing a rate of contribution.
political folly,
to do so
Beth would be the height of would play into the hands of the local communints,
18.
In taking a view now, for planning purposes, of the minimum
forces we shall need to maintain our position in Hong Kong after
1971 we should make no other financial assumptions than that
will continue & contribute
we can hope for a contribution from the Colony on a scale no less
than it is now making. To reach our conclusions in any other
es. Addi
way would be to shirk our responsibilities.
Background Notes
19.
The following comparative table indicates the measure of
the increase in force levels now proposed:-
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