TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 85

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

Part I to COS 20th Meeting/68 20th March 1968

correct as force

an annual basis:

declarations to NATO were only made on other arrangements had been made, eg with the Western European Union for the availability of forces in the longer term, but it was not correct to regard this as a NATO commitment.

SIR PETER HILL-NORTON (Representing the Chief of the Naval Staff) said that there had been insufficient time for the staff to study the paper adequately before the meeting. He therefore proposed that they should defer their consideration of the paper until DP 10/68 was taken on 9th April.

He was concerned that paragraph 6 of the paper dismissed to lightly the real improvement to NATO forces which would follow from re-categorisation; in particular, the NATO proposal to sub-divide Category B Naval forces would be welcome both to NATO and to the Royal Navy. In paragraph 1 of Annex A he did not approve of the definition suggested for "declared". It would be preferable to adhere to the wording as defined by NATO rather than substitute a Ministry of Defence definition.

SIR GEOFFREY BAKER said he agreed with the previous remarks and felt that in any revision of the paper, certain anomalies in the terms of assignment should be high-lighted. He noted as an example that whereas British officers at HQ NORTHAG were clearly assigned to NATO, the whole of one (BR) Corps was earmarked for assignment. Furthermore, it was usual for the term "declared" to cover all three types of available forces (assigned, earmarked for assignment, other forces). In this paper it was stated in paragraph 1 of Annex A that "declared" referred only to the first two categories. This could lead to confusion in subsequent studies. In paragraph 4 it was stated that "other forces available" were not included in NATO agreed war plans. This was not entirely correct since the headquarters and two brigades of 3 Division were included in the NORTHAG Emergency Defence Plan.

He felt that in deciding on any future increase in forces made available to NATO we should be as forth- coming as possible to obtain the maximum political value, rather than hedge them around with too many

safeguards".

In discussion, the following points were made:

a.

In paragraph 3 of Annex A it was necessary to differentiate between regular and reserve forces.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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