CONFIDENTIAL
Part I to COS 20th Meeting/68 20th March 1968
3.
THE TERMS OF FORCE DECLARATIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO NATO
CONFIDENT IAL
It
SIR CHARLES ELWORTHY said that the Defence Secretariat had been invited (1) to undertake a study on the Terms of Force Declarations and Assignments for the British Contribution to NATO. This study (2) had been completed somewhat hastily and was now before them. was linked with the study entitled, "Additional United Kingdom Force Contributions to NATÓ in the Short Term", which they were due to consider on 9th April 1968. Both these papers would then be discussed by the Defence Review Working Party at the end of April. The Military Committee were currently examining the procedure for assignment of forces with a view to producing an improved standard system for all nations. The subject was due for consideration by Ministers in December 1968. If we wished to commit additional forces before NATO Ministerial decisions had been taken, it would be necessary to ensure that any such commitment was made on terms satisfactory to us. It was most important that we should be able to withdraw our forces not only for operations but also for training exercises in other parts of the world, particularly East of Suez.
MR COOPER (Deputy Under-Secretary (Policy)) said that the paper was designed to set out the terms on which forces were assigned to NATO, and to show the way in which the subject was under consideration in NATO. He realised that the paper had been produced in a hurry and that there had been insufficient time for full consultation. He hoped that after their discussion, the paper could be amended as a result of consultation within the Ministry of Defence and with the Foreign Office, and then re-examined.
The re
were two alternatives open to the United Kingdom: first, that we should try to influence the discussions in NATO to meet our future needs on the terms of assignment. The second alternative was to secure special arrangements for the assignment of our forces which would permit them to be used outside NATO as required. At this stage, when it was undecided what our additional contribution to NATO would be, it was not possible to determine to what extent special arrangements would be necessary. He did not see any difficulty in the terms of assignment for any further forces made available in the short term. He pointed out that there was a tendency in the paper to consider two aspects of the assignment of forces, the short term, and the long term. This was not entirely
Notes:
1. 2.
COS 1133/23/2/68, Serial 120 (1).
COS 1199/19/3/68.
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