SECRET
5.
We consider that we should plan on maintaining the following forces in Hong Kong after 1971:-
Royal NavY
a.
Two frigates. At present we maintain one, reinforced by another from the Far East Fleet in time of tension, to support maritime police patrols and to deter Chinese naval interference and local piracy. After the withdrawal of the Far East Fleet (i.e. by the end of 1971) the reinforcement must be based on Hong Kong if it is to be available in time. Depending on deployment, it would take up to 28 days to provide a frigate from the Western Fleet.
b. Five Mine Counter-Measures Vessels. At present two MCMVs are maintained continuously at Hong Kong by rotation from Singapore, and we can reinforce them by another two in times of tension. Their role is to support maritime police patrols preventing the influx of refugees by sea, and to contribute to the control of 'piracy and smuggling. We propose that five MCMVs should be based on Hong Kong from June 1969, - after which time there will be no others based in Far East Command - as it would take some two months for MCMV reinforcements to arrive from West of Suez; the fifth is needed to allow for one to be undergoing maintenance at any time.
C. Support Facilities. We shall need a sm 11 increase in facilities ashore, and the provision of one small tanker to guard against the loss of commercial shore fuel facilities through strike action or subversion.
Army
d. 72/3 units, comprising six infantry battalions, one light regiment RA, one armoured car squadron, and one field squadron RE. This provides for the initial deployment of two battalions and the 12/3 supporting units for internal security duties in the New Territories and defence of the frontier two battalions in Kowloon and one on Hong Kong Island for internal security duties, and one battalion in immediate reserve. It could be argued, theoretically, that we could dispense with the last, and rely on rapid reinforcement from this country. But we do not consider that this would be
prudent, Difficult internal security situations have developed rapidly in Hong Kong in the past and could do so so again in the future, and the prompt exercise of authority by the Governor in the deployment of security forces is of major importance in preventing the expansion and exploitation of such situations. With the police force barely able to keep pace with increased responsibilities arising from the growth and re- distribution of the population, the time availability of the necessary forces will become even more important in the future. Rapid reinforcement from this country would be dependent upon sufficient warning being received, the necessary air routes being available, no delay being met in obtining overflight clearances, and no simultaneous major operations taking place elsewhere. Even if all these factors, which are at
least/
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SECRET
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