TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 16

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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

OPDO (DR) (68) 7

24th April, 1968

CABINET

COPY NO.

13

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE

DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY

HONG KONG GARRISON

Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence

Until it becomes possible for us to detach ourselves from Hong Kong - if that becomes our long term policy we must

- be in a position to maintain internal security, control the border effectively, and to expose as aggression any Chinese incursion by armed forces. The forces that we keep in the Colony must be fully adequate for their task, or our troops will be unnecessarily at risk. We announced in January that there was no question of reducing the strength or effectiveness of the Hong Kong Garrison.

2.

When Ministers considered the strength of the Hong Kong Garrison at OPD(66) 49th Meeting on 19th December, 1966, they concluded that the Army element should be reduced during 1967/68 by one major unit from its then level of 62/3 major units: the precise timing of the announcement of this and of the move itself were left for separate consideration after the Macao situation had settled down. Subsequently, at OPD(67) 29th Meeting on 5th September 1967, it was decided that the decision to reduce the garrison should be placed in abeyance for the time being, though it should remain our eventual objective.

3. Since Ministerial consideration in December 1966, we have been faced with serious and prolonged internal disturbances in Hong Kong, and with a difficult situation on the border; the garrison was therefore reinforced with an additional battalion from Malaysia/Singapore in June 1967, making 7/3 units, which is still its strength. And sincé the discussion in September 1967 it has been decided to complete our withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by the end of 1971, and to abandon our previous plans to maintain a special capability for use in the area, to meet the tasks outlined in paragraph 1 above.

4.

We are thus faced with a new situation, in which our forces in Hong Kong after 1971 must be self-sufficient until reinforcements could arrive from the European theatre. We have to reach our decisions in the light of this, and of the effects that knowledge of our withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore will have on the people of the Colony and on the Chinese sttitude.

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