TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 18

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least partly outside our control, worked in our favour, it would take at least 60 hours for one battalion to arrive. Accordingly, we consider that the immediate reserve battalion should be available in the Colony once we reach the situation, probably in about the middle of 1971, in which we cannot provide it from Singapore or Malaysia.

Royal Air Force

e.

Six Whirlwind Helicopters. These were introduced last year, during the emergency, to improve tactical mobility. They have proved their worth, and we consider them to be a necessary part of the long term garrison.

f. RAF Kai T-k and Tai Mo Shan. The present staging, signals and radar facilities will be needed; the latter are of intelligence value to us and our allies.

These

6.

We also need to consider whether there should be a permanent fighter presence in Hong Kong. There is no military justification for this. At present we rely on occasional visits by Hunters from Singapore, and in our view the requirement could be met if necessary, after our withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, by similar visits by Phantoms from our general capability. But the Governor considers that a permanent fighter presence would deter incursions into the Colony's air space, provide security for the operations of air lines, and contribute to maintaining the morale of the local population. arguments - and particularly the last one - are supported by the Commonwealth Secretary. If they were regarded as over-riding, on political as opposed to military grounds, a self-contained unit of four Hunters and a Hunter trainer could be provided when the squadron in Singapore is withdrawn in March 1970 and could be sustained until 1975, by which time the position could have to be reviewed. If RAF aircraft are to be permanently stationed in the Colony, it will be necessary to provide elements of a RAF regiment Squadron to protect our installations.

・the

It remains to be decided whether we should retain the present accompanied basis of the garrison or begin to move steadily towards a situation in which the bulk of the garrison will be unaccompanied; and whether we should

confirm the present plans to move to n all British garrison or keep Gurkhas in Hong Kong in the long term. These questions will be considered separately: they do not affect the size of garrison necessary, though they

will affect its costs.

Costs

3.

An understanding was reached with the Hong Kong Government in December 1966 that they would contribute £5 milion a year in cash and kind for the four years ending 31st March 1971. This broadly covered the foreign exchange costs of that element of the Army garrison, four battalions and its support, that was assessed as being in Hong Kong for internal security purposes.

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