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B.
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(c) within the framework of a major rundown and redeployment of our
forces, our ability to reorganise them in such a way as to
maintain their confidence and morale, control redunlancy and resettlement, sustain recruiting and provide the necessary
accommodation.
FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE FAR EAST
4.
It is not possible in the time available to specify except in broad terms the force levels that will result from the new policy in the Far East in 1970-71 or 1975-76. This applies both to the force levels in the
Far East and to the total size of the United Kingdom forces wherever they may be deployed. This will require a major exercise of the same order of
magnitude as the earlier studies which have taken several months, and the detailed examination of the United Kingdom base cannot be completed until this exercise has been done, It will, however, be possible to have available a broad indication of future force levels by the time a publie statement of policy is made in June or July but, inevitably, there will remain a number of points open for subsequent decision.
5.
The
The original study on the Far East (Study No. 7 of the Defence Expenditure Studies) was based on the examination of two alternative force deployments resulting in reductions of about a half by 1970-71. first (Case A) was a mainly maritime deployment, the second (Case B) a mainly land/air deployment. Subsequent discussion has concentrated on moving towards a peripheral strategy based on naval and air forces. However, the composition of the forces that will remain in Singapore and Malaysia in 1970-71 has not yet been considered; in any event a decision on this should not be taken until after at least the first round of consultations with our allies, if only because of the effect of the views of our allies. The suggestions in the following paragraphs therefore only illustrate the order of magnitude of the reductions.
6. Allowing for these factors, our initial proposals would be based on the concept that by 1970-71 our main presence in Singapore and Malaysia would be a much reduced scale of maritime and air forces. Land forces (other than those associated with, or included in, amphibious forces) would have been withdrawn apart from sone Gurkha units which could not have been rundown by that date this approach may well lead to pressure on us by Australia and New Zealand about the future of the Commonwealth Brigade. Conventional and nuclear strike forces would only be available to the
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