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POLITICO-MILITARY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED FORCE
REDUCTIONS IN THE FAR EAST
A.
INTRODUCTION
Report by the Defence Review Working Party
Officials were instructed (OPD(67) 14th Meeting, Item 2, Conclusion (4) (Confidential Annex)) to examine the implications of
Ministers' decisions that we should seek to reduce our forces and
employment of local civilians in Singapore and Malaysia by the order of a half by 1970-71 and to withdraw wholly from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-76, while not precluding the possibility of earlier withdrawal if
political events made this feasible. Ministers also took the view that we should plan on the basis that in 1975-76 (or when we left Singapore and Malaysia), we should have small maritime and air forces in Australia,
using Australian facilities, subject to the possibility being kept open
that we might decide later in the year upon total withdrawal from the
area.
2.
In this report we set out first a broad indication of the force
reductions we should make by 1970-71 and their consequences for our Treaty
obligations, commitments and force declarations, and then consider the
likely reactions of our allies and Commonwealth partners; we go on to
examine the economic consequences for Malaysia, Singapore and Nepal, the
implications for our overseas aid and the financial implications for the
United Kingdom.
3. The implementation of the force reductions, particularly in relation
to 1970-71, will require the bringing to a successful conclusion of the
process of consultation with our allies. Three major factors affect the
speed and manner of achieving the reductions
—
(a) the impact of external political events (particularly the end of
hostilities in Vietnam whenever this occurs);
(b) the impact of our reductions on local economies, notably in
Singapore where the expenditure of our forces represents about 20 per cent of the Gross Tomestic Product and where we employ nearly 10 per cent of the local labour force with unemployment
in the area already over 10 per cent, and the extent to which
we are able to mitigate the impact through economic aid;
(97793)
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