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CINCFE. 1589/9025/5
UK EYES ONLY
was possible that in some instances guidance from Whitehall had not been iven as promptly as it should have been. He would look into this aspect on return to London and try to ensure that guidance from the Ministry of Deinon was given as quickly as possible in future. The SECRETARY OF STATE said that he wished to comment on the points which the Commander-in-Chief had made under the same headings which he had used.
a.
The Long Term
ๆ
The SECRETARY OF STATE noted the points which had been made and said that the question of our retention of a military capability in the area after 1975 was one which must be decided soon. A decision was expected in the next two weeks. The SECRETARY OF STATE fully appreciated the strength of the argument that a public statement to the effect that we planned to leave the Asian mainland by 1975 should not be made now. However, the possibility of a deterioration of the situation in the Far East was more likely to influence some sections of opinion towards a public announcement of a firm departure date now than to make them feel that it would be more prudent to leave the options open. It was true that the Overseas Chinese were an important element in the security of the area and we should not encourage them to look to Peking for guidance and protection.
The SECRETARY OF STATE stated that he felt that the future of the Brigade of Gurkhas was a key issue in itself the subject was relatively minor, but decisions on the policy to be followed in this respect involved all the factors and considerations connected with the larger issues in the Far East.
The SECRETARY OF STATE was in broad agreement with the views expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, although he did not wish to express an opinion now regarding the relative values of a small force in Singapore and a larger force further away.
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b.
The Medium Term
1
The SECRETARY OF STATE stated that he understood the reasons why 1st April 1971 was preferred by the Commander-in-Chief as the date by which the 50% cut was to be achieved. The acceptance of the later date had financial implications and, if this date was agreed, it was possible that savings would be called for by the withdrawal of teeth arms earlier than would otherwise have been necessary. The desirability of an early announcement on our intentions to make a 50% reduction was agreed, but much depended upon decisions regarding the future of 28th Commonwealth Brigade, which was of particular concern to Australia and New Zealand. There would be opposition to an announcement of Far East reductions before one concerning force levels throughout the British services. The SECRETARY OF STATE appreciated the security aspects involved in restricting knowledge of our intentions, particularly in those headquarters which contained Australian and New Zealand officers. However, he saw no objection to informing on a 'need to know' basis those United Kingdom personnel who would be involved in planning the reductions up to 1970/71. The SECRETARY OF STATE said that it would probably be necessary to say that 28th Commonwealth Brigade might not be able to continue in its present form. As regards the lines to be followed on this subject by the Commander-in-Chief during his forthcoming visit to Australasia, the SECRETARY OF STATE said that he would ask the Chief of Defence Staff to ensure that guidance was given by the end of the following week. Approval of the Short-term reductions in principle should be obtained within a fortnight. The SECRETARY OF STATE said that the Commander-in-Chief should receive guidance from the Chiefs of Staff on the lines to be followed in planning for the medium-term in the next three weeks. This would be given in the light of the reports which the Secretary of State and his party would make on their return to London. This guidance would enable the Commander-in-Chief to plan the optimin. force mix for the 1970/71 period, which he might wish to visit London to (iscuss. The next task would be the planning of the rundown for the remainder of the period.
/The.
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