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CINCFE. 1589/9025/5
UK EYES ONLY
Naval and air force declarations could be adjusted to meet whichever land force solution was selected but it should be borne in mind that the Commander-in-Chief would be attending the SEATO Military Advisers' Conference in September, that on ANZAM Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting was due in October 1967 and 2 SEATO Council Meeting in April 1968. At all these meetings, these subjects were sure to be raised.
As regards Hong Kong the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF felt that the decision to reduce the level of the garrison there should if possible now be cancelled. If a 50% cut in the strength of our forces in the Far East were to be made, the Hong Kong garrison should be restored to 6 major units, with plans to reinforce with a Commando from Singapore and an infantry battalion from the United Kingdom, if required.
If the withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia was to be complete, the Hong Kong garrison should be raised to 7 major units, possibly including a fourth Gurkha battalion. In reply to a question from the Secretary of State the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF stated that he did not believe that a preponderance of United Kingdom, as opposed to Gurkha, troops was required in Hong Kong but at least two battalions should be from the United Kingdom. The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF stated that we should plan on making Hong Kong militarily independant by 1st April 1970 and that it must be accepted that to do so would involve some increase in the size of stock levels and staffs in the Colony.
2.
C.
The Short Term
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF stated that he had received a signal(1) from the Chief of the Defence Staff commenting on our proposed reductions. The signal was read to the meeting. The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF said that a copy of our paper(2) on our proposed reductions was now being sent to the Ministry of Defence. The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF said that it might be asked why such reductions had not been made earlier, but the withdrawal from Borneo had been completed and reduction to Defence Review Force levels by October 1967 set in train. Pending new assumptions, the further economies which we had proposed could only have been based on the retention of commitments in their current form and on force levels remaining at the end of these reductions. The further economies now proposed were acceptable in the light of the knowledge of what was foreshadowed in subsequent years.
In conclusion the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF said that new decisions were now needed and the necessary action would be taken as soon as those had been given. The Secretary of State's visit had been most valuable ‘in giving us the latest trends of thought in London and in obtaining the reactions of Singapore and Malaysia to the British proposals. The Commander-in-Chief was shortly to visit Australia and New Zealand and would require guidance on the lines he was to follow during his talks there. The SECRETARY OF STATE said that he appreciated this and the necessary advice would be given by the Chief of Defence Staff before the Commander-in-Chief's departure on the 9th May. Finally the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF asked that the interests of Australia and New Zealand should be considered as much as possible in the formulation of our plans.
In reply the SECRETARY OF STATE thanked the Commander-in-Chief for his summing-up of the situation and said that as a result of his visit he now had a clearer picture of the fundamental issues created as a result of the decisions which had been made about the Far East. The SECRETARY OF STATE said that he had at no time felt that any delays in making reductions originated in the Far East.
Notes:
RTT/261640Z/COSSEA 35.
/It.
1.
2.
CINCFE. 16/67 dated 27th April 1967.
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