TOP SECRET
CINCFE. 1589/9025/5
UK EYES ONLY
The SECRETARY OF STATE said that in London there was a certain lack of understanding of the Singapore Base's facilities and requirements and he suggested that a functional analysis relating the functions of the base to force levels and stock-piles might be of value.
As regards SEATO the SECRETARY OF STATE said that he had not previously realised how great an effect our SEATO commitments, particularly Plan 4, had on the size and pattern of the base. The SEATO alliance was not generally popular in Londen or in Malaysia, though it was of value to the United States and Australia in providing some justification for policies which they pursued for other reasons. The SECRETARY OF STATE felt that, if it was decided to retain a British military capability in the Far East after 1975 and that the Anglo/Malaysian Defence Agreement should continue in force then, the price of such a decision might be a lessening of our involvement with SEATO.
The SECRETARY OF STATE said that the Chiefs of Staff felt that if we were to reduce our forces in Singapore/Malaysia by half by 1970/71 then the major unit which it had been intended to withdraw should be restored to the Hong Kong garrison. The SECRETARY OF STATE viewed this proposal charitably.
C. The Short Term
The SECRETARY OF STATE thanked the Commander-in-Chief for the paper(3) which had been produced, which was most useful. The SECRETARY OF STATE questioned a statement in the paper that the withdrawal of the three CMS ex Hong Kong from Far East Fleet would increase stretch for remaining MCM ships. The FLEET COMMANDER stated that this type of ship was more involved with SEATO exercises than those of other types and that, with the withdrawal of these three CMS, the reserve remaining to cover emergencies such as mechanical failures was very small and likely to be hard-worked.
The SECRETARY OF STATE said that he was likely to be asked by the press which commitments we were giving up in view of our decision to reduce by 20,000 men. He would say that all our existing commitments were being retained. The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF stated that our ability to meet all our present commitments remained but it would take longer to do so than hitherto if the need arose. This fact was acceptable in view of Communist China's present pre-occupation with her own intemal affairs and the North Vietnamese Army's involvement in South Vietnam. Both these factors made further adventures by either country elsewhere in the Far East most improbable at present.
The SECRETARY OF STATE said that he accepted the arguments for retention of a strike carrier in Far East Fleet whilst the Aden commitment existed but was less convinced of the need to do so thereafter. The FLEET COMMANDER said that he understood that the Secretary of State was more interested in the effect which the withdrawal of a carrier from Far East Fleet would have on the rundown plans for the Singapore dockyard than in the paper saving of 2,400 men which would accrue from the carrier's transfer to the United Kingdom,
Decisions on how the dockyard was to be run down and its productive capacity reduced would be greatly affected by the decisions which would be made on post-Aden carrier commitments in the Far East. Dockyard costs in the Singapore dockyard were lower than those in the United Kingdom and it seemed sensible to avail ourselves of these if a carrier was to be deployed in the Far East.
Note:
3.
CINCFE. 1520/6130/18 dated 26th April 1967
-6-
TOP SECRET
/Conclusion.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.