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49. We might feel obliged to seek to withdraw following a period of Chinese pressure (short of military takeover) which indicated that China had a serious intention to make our position untenable in the Colony (as distinct from pressure for propaganda purposes or to show displeasure with British or Hong Kong policies). Such pressure might take an economic form, e.g. denial of food and water supplies or might be political, i.e. open encouragement of subversion and violence among local Communists and their supporters, together with a clear indication of China's support in the shape of inspired and organised border incidents, infiltration of trained terrorist units, etc. It is not inconceivable that continuing physical pressure by local Communists over a prolonged period would, even without direct support from China, make our position impossible not so much because we might lose the battle for the minds and hearts of the
Chinese population and control of internal security, but because economic disruption and, above all, loss of business confidence within and without the Colony might slowly sap its economic health. But the last few months have shown that, in the absence of any sign
that China intends to end our rule in Hong Kong or that we are prepared to go, local confidence and the confidence of the outside world have not been seriously impaired.
The Problems
50. First and foremost of these will be the discharge of our responsibilities to British subjects and foreign nationals resident in the Colony and to British and foreign assets there (paragraphs 20-27 above). Secondly there will be the problems of maintaining internal security after the decision to withdraw has been announced: public confidence will be destroyed overnight and with it may vanish the inclination to accept established authority. 51. Given adequate time and no Chinese interference, there should be no difficulty in providing facilities for those non-Chinese who wish to leave the Colony with their moveable assets. Our problem would lie in the discharge of our responsibilities to nearly two million Chinese who are British subjects and in particular to the 100-200,000 Chinese, both British subjects and aliens, who would be vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. We could not expect to obtain from the Chinese satisfactory guarantees for the future treatment of those (the vast majority) who would have to stay in Hong Kong.
52.
Even the vulnerable category presents what is an intractable
No countries have agreed to take Chinese in significant
problem.
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