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numbers; those that have taken them have required the possession of certain skills or professional qualifications. Most of the
vulnerable category will have these but there may be some financially expensive resettlement costs.
53. There are about 35,000 Hong Kong Chinese in the United Kingdom; there could be considerable opposition to taking any more. Taiwan would no doubt in these circumstances take quite a large number. America and Canada are countries with large Chinese communities that might take significant numbers. Some South American countries (e.g. Brazil) might offer special facilities. But we cannot talk to any of these countries (other, possibly, than America, Canada and Australia) in advance about this problem. The period of our withdrawal is likely to be measured in months and past experience (as evidenced by U.N. efforts on behalf of refugees) has shown that much longer than this will be necessary to negotiate permanent settlement opportunities. Temporary transit areas will therefore be necessary and we may find countries very reluctant to act as host to large numbers of Chinese who have no guarantee of permanent residence elsewhere. Singapore, Taiwan, Philippines and our Pacific dependencies may be possibilities. 54. The second major problem will be the maintenance of internal security. Public knowledge that we were preparing to withdraw would have an immediate and profound effect on the internal security situation. Those fearful of the change of regime would be clamouring to get out; communists would get to work on a confused public and rally their sympathisers whose numbers would mushroom overnight among those (the great majority) of the population who would see no alternative but to remain; they would be joined by criminal and hooligan elements. The morale of the Police Force would dip sharply (if it did not disintegrate altogether); the Force is preponderantly Chinese and its members would understandably be looking over their shoulders. The task of maintaining public order might devolve entirely on the garrison and the likelihood is that it will prove impossible to maintain control throughout the whole area of the Colon This would undoubtedly be the case if the Chinese Government
deliberately set out to foment the situation.
55. These two major problems present us with a conflict in time scales. We should need as much time as we could get to discharge our responsibilities to people. But the difficulties we would face in circumstances of growing disorder and economic confusion indicate that the period of withdrawal should be as short as possible.
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