TOP SECI WY
impossible to do so throughout the whole ares of the
Colonys this would undoubtedly be the case if the
Chinese Gor÷rrment deliberately set out to foment the
situation. The nature of this problem points to the
need for some understanding with the Chinese about our
withdrawal with a view to their exereising some control,
direct or indirect, over their supporters and sympathiearG
We return to this point in paragraphs 16 - 19.
Modas of Withdrawal
15. We could set about implementing a decision to
withdraw by -
16.
(1) unilateral action, declaring our intention to
-
go in a specified period of time - with or
without an indication of our readiness to talk
to the Chinese about it; in circumstances in
which we might feel obliged to withdraw
(paragraph 3 above) this might be the only
course open to usj
(11) approaching the Chinese with an offer to
negotiate our withdrawal. This might include
(but not initially) an offer to consider an
interin period of duel Anglo-Chinese control
of the Colony.
It is most unlikely (with the precedent of Shanghai
before us) that China would stand by while we etripped
Hong Kong of such people and assets as we wished to reXINS,
We can expect to be restricted both as to the time
allowed and in cur freedom of action.
attitude of milccon
Given the
Chinese Governmei to our tenure
of the Colony and to foreign Governments in general,
they are likely to want to make our loss and discomfiture
as great as possible.
Nor is it within our power, bj
military force, to hold them off while we make the
necessary arrangements.
We would need time (probably
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