is likely to be measured in months and past experience
(ae evidenced by U.l. efforts on behalf of refugees)
has shown that much longer than thie will be necessary to
negotiate permanent settlement opportunities.
Temporary
transit areas will therefore be necessary and we may find
countries tory reluctant to aot op host to large numbers
very
of Chinese who have no guarantee of permanent residence
elsewhere.
Singapory Talwan, Mantin and our Poolrio
dependencies may be possibilities,
13. There are the British asouta. It would be foumb10
in a planned and phased withiraasl to arrange the renovat
or transfer of a considerable proportion of moveable
aseste (including er course military spd particularly
*sensitive" equipment and stores). There would reagin
large investments in fixed sonets (building and heavy
plant) for whioh nothing oould be reclined excope by
agrecsent with the Chinese.
14. The
The second major prodlow will be the maintenance of
internal security. Public knogledze
propering to the old any an immediate and profound
offect on the internal security situations
get out constndata w0014
Poartup of the chongo or ragine would be clamourin to
communists would get to work on a confused
public and rally their ayapathloro mono nors woul
auchroom overnight song those (the rest majority) or
the population who would see ne alternative but to remain;
they would be joined by arizinal and hooligen elements.
The morale of the Police Force would dip sharply (ir at
did not disintegrate altogether); the Perce is
preponderently Chinese and its members would under-
otandably be looking over their shouldare.
maintaining public order night devolva entirely on the
garrison and the likelihood is that it will prove
The tank of
/ impossible ***
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