not less than six months) to deal with certain of the
problems we would face, This faster and the very nature
of some of these problema (particularly the maintenance
or internal security) indicates the need to resch some
understanding or arrangement with China.
17. It is perhape arguable that we could achieve the
best conditions for withdrawal, in all the ciremstances,
either by accepting a Maeso-type situation (rather than
making a hurried unilateral attempt to withdraw) or by
deliberately offering to associate the Chinese Government
with the administration of the territory during a banding-
over period. On the face of it, these cournee could have
the merit of frustrating the worst Chinese intentions.
18. To follow the first of these courses would, as han
been noted in paragraph 14 of our Interim Report, put as
entirely in the hands of the Chinese, both as to the
manner and timing of our final departure; we would have
no bargaining power when it came to seeking an eventual
settlement; our people there would be hostages who would
Additionally
an
be used to extract the maxinum concessions.
our lack of effective authority could raise acute politiesi
difficulties in relation to Ministers' responsibilities
to Farliament for the administration of the territory.
The caẩy sảvantages we can see are that it might limit
insediate bloodshed and make it easier eventually to
surrender the Colony in an orderly fashion, Fo therefore
confirm our earlier conclusion that this course is quite
unacceptable.
19. The second course sould by comparinon have the merit
that the arrangement would (on paper) have a fixed ters
to ruin. But as a course to be pursued deliberately,
even in a situation where the Chinese are showing a spirit
of reasonable co-operation, it carries come great dangera.
/ From #
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